Matt Mandelkern
Fall 2024, Thursdays, 1:15-3:15, NYU
'In philosophy it is can in particular that we seem so often to recover, just as we had thought some problem settled, grinning residually up at us like a frog at the bottom of the beer mug.' - Austin, Ifs and Cans
What does it mean to say S is able to φ? We will explore this issue from both the point of view of the philosophy of language, where it raises interesting issues in modal semantics, and philosophy of action, where it has been a central part of traditional questions about human action and agency.
Schedule:
September 5:
The existential analysis and some puzzles
Kenny,
Human abilities and dynamic modalities; Kratzer,
What 'Must' and 'Can' must and can mean; Hackl,
On the semantics of "ability attributions"
Handout
September 12:
Modally complex analyses The mixed modal analysis: Brown,
On the logic of ability
Conditional analyses: Thomason,
Ability, action and context; Honoré,
Can and Can't; Austin,
Ifs and Cans; Mandelkern, Schultheis, and Boylan,
Agentive modals
Handout
September 19: No class (Matt away)
September 26:
Language models and abilities
Guest speaker:
Jacqueline Harding, Harding and Sharadin,
What is it for a Machine Learning Model to Have a Capability?
October 3:
More on conditional analyses
Handout
October 10:
Ability vs. Control
Boylan,
Does Success entail Ability?;
Santorio,
Ability as dependence modality, Kikkert,
Ability's two dimensions of robustness; Loets and Zakkou,
Agentive Duality Reconsidered
Handout
October 17:
Ability and probability
Mandelkern,
Chance, ability and control,
Handout
October 24:
Ability and determinism
Lewis,
Are we free to break the laws?; Lewis,
Counterfactual dependence and time's arrow, Dorr,
Against counterfactual miracles; Holguin and Teitel,
On the plurality of counterfactuals; Albritton,
Freedom of will and freedom of action; Setiya,
Freedom and the will;
Handout
October 31:
Ability and dispositions Vetter,
Are abilities dispositions?; Fara,
Masked ability and compatibilism;
Vihvelin,
Free Will Demystified: A Dispositional Account
Handout
November 7:
Inexact abilityGuest speaker:
Annina Loets,
Inexact Ability
November 14:
Actuality entailmentsGuest speaker:
David Boylan on
Ability and Actuality (joint work with Ginger Schultheis).
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This paper gives a new account of the actuality entailments of ability claims. We first observe that, in
the environments which give rise to the actuality entailment, ability claims carry a presupposition of trying.
We show that, given this presupposition, the actuality entailment is straightforwardly predicted by a
conditional theory of ability.We also give a theory of why this presupposition arises.We claim that perfective
aspect introduces a presupposition of settledness; and we say that the relevant conditionals for ability
claims are settled only when their antecedents are true.
For background, see Nadathur, Actuality entailments
November 21: Ability and modal epistemology
Vetter, Abilities and the epistemology of ordinary modality, An Agency-Based Epistemology of Modality; Williamson, Philosophical knowledge and knowledge of counterfactuals, background on acquisition: Cournane, Learning modals: A grammatical perspective
November 28: No class (Thanksgiving)
December 5: Ability and ethics
Blumberg, Inability and permission; for background, Section 2.3 of King, What we ought and what we can (email me for a PDF)
December 12: TBA
Schwarz, Ability and possibility?
Fusco, Agential free choice, Nouwen, Free choice and distribution over disjunction: The case of free choice ability
Serious metaphysics?
More epistemology?
Graded abilities
Something on compulsion and addiction